Mr N Brockley, Counsel For the v Respondent — 2019

The tribunal found that the claimant was not disabled for the purposes of s.6 EqA 2010. It accepted that she had a long-standing anxiety condition, described in the evidence as mild, but concluded that it did not have a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities during 2016. The underactive thyroid condition was ruled out as part of the pleaded case. Because the claimant did not satisfy the disability definition, the tribunal dismissed the disability discrimination claim and did not proceed to make separate findings under s.15 or ss.20-21 EqA.

On the unfair dismissal claim, the tribunal found that the respondent dismissed the claimant for capability, a potentially fair reason under s.98(2)(a) ERA 1996. It accepted that the claimant had been moved from a specialist role into the well-being adviser role, given training and intensive support, and then managed through a formal capability process over about 11 months. The tribunal found that the claimant’s performance problems were not limited to target figures but went to the broader ability to research, understand, and apply advice, and that she did not reach the required standard despite coaching and review.

Applying s.98(4) ERA 1996, the tribunal concluded that the procedure was fair. It found that the capability process was followed fairly, that the reports prepared by JP were fit for purpose, and that the decision-makers did not act with bias despite earlier grievances and the collective grievance. The tribunal also rejected the argument that the appeal chair and trustee panel were disqualified by prior involvement, noting the respondent’s size and the absence of any material unfairness. It accepted that there were some aspects of the management process that were not pristine, but held that the dismissal was nonetheless fair, substantively and procedurally.