Ms E Lanlehin (Counsel) For v Respondent — 2021

The tribunal found that the claimant worked for Pulse Healthcare Limited while she was on placement with the respondent until she secured a substantive post with the respondent on 1 November 2016. On that evidence, her employment with the respondent began on 1 November 2016, not in February or October 2015 as she contended. By the effective date of termination on 11 May 2018 she had not completed two years’ continuous service, so the unfair dismissal claim failed for want of jurisdiction under s.108(1) ERA 1996.

The tribunal nevertheless went on to consider fairness on the merits. It found that the claimant had been suspended from practice by the HCPC and could not legally perform the duties of a Clinical Psychologist. The respondent considered permanent redeployment, temporary redeployment and suspension, but found no suitable temporary roles and was concerned that the claimant’s registration might not be restored after the six-month suspension. In those circumstances, the tribunal held that dismissal was for a substantial reason and was within the range of reasonable responses under s.98(4) ERA 1996.

On procedure, the tribunal found that the respondent invited the claimant to meeting, allowed representation, heard her explanation and followed principles of its disciplinary policy and the ACAS Code. It also accepted the respondent’s view that it was not appropriate to challenge the HCPC’s findings. The tribunal therefore said that, even if the claimant had had sufficient service, the unfair dismissal claim would have failed on its merits.

The direct race discrimination claim was dismissed. The tribunal found that the claimant had not raised race as a factor during the dismissal or appeal processes and had produced no evidence showing that race materially influenced the respondent’s decision. It rejected reliance on a hypothetical comparator and on an unattributed remark by a trade union representative, and accepted the respondent’s evidence that white employees in comparable registration-suspension situations had also been dismissed or, where registration had later been restored before appeal, reinstated. The tribunal concluded that there were no facts from which race discrimination could properly be inferred.