Ms M McGee (Counsel) For the v Respondent — 2021

The tribunal heard only a preliminary issue on disability status. The claimant had claimed direct disability discrimination and a failure to make reasonable adjustments, together with constructive unfair dismissal, unlawful deductions from wages or breach of contract, and accrued holiday pay. The respondent accepted that he was disabled by anxiety and depression at the material times, but disputed that he was disabled by reason of dyslexia. The relevant dyslexia issue was whether he was disabled on 30 August 2019, when the respondent refused to fund the Davis Dyslexia programme.

The tribunal accepted that the claimant had been diagnosed as dyslexic in his late teens and that, before the onset of depression and anxiety, his coping strategies worked well. It found that from April 2018 those strategies began to break down as his stress, anxiety and depression increased. By August 2019 he needed others to help draft and proofread correspondence, could not trust his own written output, relied on his wife and Mr Hollebon to check documents and instructions, and remained disorientated when driving, particularly at junctions and roundabouts. It also accepted that he struggled to read and to follow television programmes and ordinary tasks.

Applying the Equality Act 2010 definition of disability and the cited authorities, the tribunal found those effects were more than minor or trivial and had lasted for more than 12 months. It rejected the respondent's submission that the dyslexia effects necessarily improved as the depressive symptoms improved, and held that the claimant's dyslexia remained substantially adverse at the material time. The tribunal therefore found that the claimant was disabled by reason of dyslexia on 30 August 2019. The judgment did not determine the merits of the substantive claims and made no award.