Mrs J Smith v Glyndwr University — 2019

Mrs J Smith was employed by Glyndwr University from 9 July 2007 until 9 April 2018. Her claim, presented on 21 October 2018, pleaded unfair dismissal, sex discrimination and disability discrimination. The tribunal recorded that the primary limitation date for all three claims was 8 July 2018. It also noted that the appeal outcome letter was dated 12 July 2018 and received by 15 July 2018. The sex discrimination complaint was pleaded as differential redundancy or severance pay compared with male comparators, and the disability complaint concerned alleged disability-related issues in the redundancy process, including recording meetings.

The tribunal accepted that Mrs Smith had serious family health responsibilities in the months before and after dismissal, including her mother’s diagnosis, her father’s health issues and concerns relating to her husband. It also accepted that she had stress and mental health difficulties, and that her GP later referred to low mood, anxiety and stress due to her mother’s diagnosis. However, it found that she was able to correspond with the University in writing and by email between April and July 2018, and that she was able to present a detailed case at the appeal hearing on 22 May 2018. The tribunal compared that correspondence with the ET1 and concluded that she knew the material facts and could articulate the substance of her claims within the primary time limit.

Applying the section 111 ERA 1996 test of reasonable practicability, the tribunal held that it was reasonably feasible for the unfair dismissal claim to have been presented by 8 July 2018. It rejected the argument that her circumstances made it impossible to put pen to paper, and dismissed the unfair dismissal claim for want of jurisdiction. For the discrimination claims, the tribunal applied section 123 Equality Act 2010 and refused to extend time on a just and equitable basis. It found that the delay after July 2018 was driven by a hope of an amicable resolution after the appeal process rather than any foundation for delay, and that this was not a reasonable explanation for waiting until 21 October 2018.

The tribunal therefore dismissed all three claims. It did not reach any merits findings beyond the limitation analysis, and no remedy was awarded.