Case 2207135/2020 · Employment Tribunal
Melanie Sharpe (Counsel) For the v Respondent — 2022
- Case reference
- 2207135/2020
- Decision date
- 2 March 2022
- Jurisdiction
- England & Wales
- Judge
- Employment Judge E Burns Representation
Parties
1 namedClaimant
Melanie Sharpe (Counsel) For the
Respondent
- —
Key findings
Tribunal's reasoningThe claimant worked at the London Institute of Medical Sciences in the Mass Spectrometry Facility from 1 November 2018 until her resignation on 11 September 2020. The tribunal accepted that, after an initial settling-in period, she performed more than the basic Band 5 duties envisaged for her role and that Dr Kramer did not distinguish between her and Mr Montoya when allocating proteomics work. It found that she and Mr Montoya were doing like work from about three to six months after she started, but that she was not doing like work to Dr Mokochinski because his metabolomics role involved materially different work and a substantial amount of setting up a new field of research for the Facility. It also found that the pay gap between the claimant and Mr Montoya was roughly between £7,000 and £7,500 on the 2018 scale, narrowing to about £3,000 after the claimant received a backdated responsibility allowance, and that the gap between the claimant and Dr Mokochinski was more than £9,000 on the 2018 scale, narrowing to about £4,700 on the 2019 scale after that allowance.
The equal pay claims were dismissed. Although like work was established against Mr Montoya, the tribunal held that the difference in pay was not because of sex. The claimant had been recruited to a genuine Band 5 role despite being able to work at a higher level; the tribunal found that the respondent's failure to manage that situation properly, and its later payment of a responsibility allowance, were not sex-based. It also relied on the respondent's pay and grading policy, including the normal move from Band A to Band B after the minimum service period, and found that Mr Montoya's movement to Band 4B followed that policy. As to Dr Mokochinski, the tribunal found that the higher salary was driven by market forces and the need to secure a candidate with particular skills and experience against another offer, not by sex.
The whistleblowing claim under section 47B ERA 1996 was dismissed because the tribunal found that none of the three alleged disclosures were protected disclosures. It held that the claimant was complaining about incorrect job evaluation, pay banding and what she described as financial exploitation, but that she did not disclose information tending to show that the health or safety of any individual was endangered. The tribunal considered the surrounding context, including the claimant's resignation letter and her evidence that she had not raised health and safety concerns, and concluded that the disclosures did not fall within section 43B.
The victimisation claim under section 27 Equality Act 2010 was also dismissed. The tribunal found that the claimant's 3 April 2020 request for her job to be evaluated did not amount to a protected act because she did not say that she believed she was being treated less favourably because of sex. It rejected the submission that sex discrimination was implicit in the request or in the later request to compare her role with those of Mr Montoya and Dr Mokochinski. In any event, the tribunal found that Dr Kramer had a clear reason for not nominating the claimant for a Special Award, namely that he considered Dr Mokochinski's work to be exceptional and did not want to dilute the value of the scheme by nominating all his staff, and that he would have acted the same way regardless of any pay complaint.
Claims and outcomes
3 findings recorded| Claim type | Issue or finding | Outcome | Protected characteristic | Award |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal pay | The tribunal found the claimant was doing like work to Mr Montoya from about three to six months after starting, but not to Dr Mokochinski. It held that the pay differences were not because of sex: the claimant had been recruited to and paid for a Band 5 role while working at Band 4, the respondent applied its normal pay and promotion policy, and Dr Mokochinski's higher pay was driven by market forces and the need to secure him against another offer. The tribunal did not determine the equal value issue separately, but dismissed the equal pay claims overall. | Dismissed | Sex | — |
| Whistleblowing | The tribunal held that the alleged disclosures on 28 September 2020, 27 October 2020 and 25 November 2020 were not protected disclosures under section 43B ERA 1996. It found that what the claimant said was about job evaluation, pay banding and financial exploitation, and did not amount to disclosure of information tending to show that any individual's health or safety was at risk. | Dismissed | — | — |
| Victimisation | The tribunal held that the claimant's 3 April 2020 email asking for her role to be job evaluated was not a protected act because it did not amount to an allegation of sex discrimination. It therefore rejected the victimisation claim based on the later non-nomination for a Special Award. The tribunal also found that Dr Kramer had a genuine reason for nominating Dr Mokochinski and would have acted in the same way regardless of any pay complaint. | Dismissed | Sex | — |
Legal tests applied
18 references- s.65 Equality Act 2010 like work
- s.69 Equality Act 2010 material factor defence
- s.43B ERA 1996 protected disclosure
- Cavendish Munro
- Kilraine
- Chesterton Global
- s.27 Equality Act 2010 victimisation
- Shamoon detriment test
- Beneviste v Kingston University
- s.136 Equality Act 2010 burden of proof
- Igen v Wong
- Madarassy
- Efobi
- Capper Pass
- Dorothy Perkins
- Macarthys
- Kells
- Glasgow City Council v Marshall
Official outcome judgment PDF
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