In person For the First v Respondent — 2024

The claimant worked for the first respondent in the second respondent's Harrods store under a concession arrangement. The second respondent accepted that he was a contract worker for Equality Act purposes, but the tribunal held that he was not a limb (b) worker under section 230(3)(b) ERA 1996 and not a worker under section 83(2)(a) EqA 2010 in relation to the second respondent. The tribunal found no express or implied contract for personal service with Harrods: the claimed store-floor assistance was not sufficiently defined or clearly remunerated, and the dress-code, briefing, and store-approval arrangements arose from the concession framework rather than a direct personal-service contract.

The tribunal nevertheless held that the claimant fell within the extended whistleblowing worker definition in section 43K(1)(a) ERA 1996 in relation to the second respondent. It accepted that he worked in the Harrods store in circumstances where he was introduced or supplied by the first respondent, and that the terms on which he was engaged were in practice substantially determined by both respondents. The tribunal relied on the contractual concession arrangements, the store approval policy, and the practical role that Harrods could play in objecting to or withdrawing approval for concession staff.

At the hearing the claimant withdrew his automatic unfair dismissal claims under sections 103A and 100 ERA 1996 against the second respondent, and the judge said a separate judgment on withdrawal would be issued. The tribunal then refused four amendment applications under the Selkent line of authority. Those applications sought to add, among other things, perceived disability harassment/discrimination, further whistleblowing allegations based on alleged "time theft", conspiracy/sham-investigation allegations, and nine individual respondents. The refusals were based on delay, lack of clarity, the procedural complexity of the case, and the hardship that further amendments would cause, with the judge noting that conspiracy is not a tribunal cause of action.