In person For the v Mr R Aston, solicitor — 2017

This was a preliminary hearing on whether Ms Dawson was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, on the basis of tendinitis affecting her wrists during the period from 27 August 2014 to her dismissal on 17 June 2015. The tribunal noted that the claim form also included unfair dismissal and holiday pay, but those issues were not determined at this hearing and were left for the full merits hearing.

The tribunal preferred the medical records and the joint expert evidence over the claimant's recollection where there was conflict. It found that the first treatment reference in the records was on 16 January 2015, when wrist pain was recorded and medication was started. By 23 January 2015 the claimant reported improvement, and by 3 February 2015 she was still working, although seeking reduced hours and physiotherapy. A certificate on 27 March 2015 signed her off for a month, a further certificate on 24 April 2015 extended that absence, and on 1 June 2015 she was certified as possibly fit for work with a phased return.

The tribunal accepted that the claimant had a wrist condition, but found that it did not have a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities during the material period. It found that she was able to continue driving to work, perform her work duties serving meals and drinks, live mostly alone without assistance for shopping or personal care, and use a shower with a hand-held attachment. It also found that heavy lifting was not a normal day-to-day activity for the purposes of the Equality Act definition.

The tribunal further found that the condition was not long-term. It concluded that the problem lasted about five months, had resolved by mid-June 2015, and was discharged from physiotherapy on 16 June 2015, the day before dismissal. Relying on the medical evidence, including Dr McCarthy's view that the records refuted disability and Dr Mason's view that she would not consider the claimant disabled when she returned to work, the tribunal held that the claimant did not meet the definition of disability at the material time and dismissed the disability discrimination claim.