Mr Mason v FD Copeland & Sons Ltd — 2026

Mr Mason worked for FD Copeland & Sons Ltd for 39 years and was summarily dismissed on 2 February 2024 following an investigation and disciplinary process concerning his conduct towards Ms Howse. He pursued ordinary unfair dismissal, protected-disclosure detriment and automatic unfair dismissal, direct age, sex and race discrimination, unlawful deduction from wages, and breach of contract concerning the September 2023 bonus.

Of ten alleged disclosures, the tribunal found two protected disclosures: Mr Mason's 2019 complaint about welding near flammable material and his 2021 complaint about blocked stairwells. The detriment complaints were dismissed because the tribunal found that the disclosures had not materially influenced the treatment alleged; relevant decision-makers were unaware of them or acted for unrelated reasons. The automatic unfair dismissal complaint was also dismissed because there was no evidence that either protected disclosure was the reason or principal reason for dismissal.

The age and race discrimination complaints were dismissed because the tribunal found no less favourable treatment because of those characteristics. The sex discrimination allegations concerning the investigation were also dismissed. The tribunal found that the refusal on 31 March 2021 to restore Mr Mason's pre-Covid hours would have amounted to direct sex discrimination: the burden of proof shifted, and the respondent did not provide cogent evidence that the refusal was in no sense because of sex. That complaint was nevertheless dismissed because it was presented almost three years late, no explanation for the delay was given, and the tribunal declined to extend time on a just and equitable basis.

The ordinary unfair dismissal complaint was dismissed. The tribunal found that conduct was the reason for dismissal and that the respondent had reasonable grounds, based on corroborated evidence gathered by an external investigator, for its belief in the misconduct. It found that the investigation and disciplinary process were within the range of reasonable responses. Although the tribunal considered that Mr Mason should have been allowed to be accompanied by his wife at the disciplinary hearing and that allowing one or two character witnesses may have been advisable, those matters did not render the overall procedure unfair. Summary dismissal for conduct the respondent classified as gross misconduct was within the range of reasonable responses.

The unlawful deduction from wages complaint concerning the bonus was dismissed because the bonus had not yet been declared or quantified and was therefore not an identifiable sum properly payable. The breach of contract complaint succeeded. Although the contract gave the respondent wide discretion over the bonus, the tribunal found that withholding it solely because Mr Mason was suspended was an irrational or perverse exercise of that discretion. It relied on the express contractual exclusions, the description of suspension as a neutral act that did not affect normal contractual benefits, Mr Mason's history of receiving the bonus, and the fact that the bonus related to a financial year in which there were no performance concerns.