Mr D Hoppe v Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs and 2 others — 2019

The claimant brought complaints under section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 alleging detriments on the ground that he had made protected disclosures. The complaints concerned three alleged matters: HMRC/GLD's failure to respond to an application about determining the legality of MOIS, alleged abuse of investigatory powers causing loss of evidence from the claimant's computer, and an alleged application for an injunction to prevent press reporting. The Minister was named on the basis of alleged legal responsibility for HMRC and GLD and a failure to respond to the claimant's letter.

The tribunal struck out Detriment 1 against HMRC and GLD. It found that the alleged failure to respond was an omission in the conduct of litigation which could not reasonably be understood as a detriment. It also found no reasonable prospect of proving that the failure prolonged the litigation, affected the claimant's health in the way alleged, impaired his ability to argue the application, or changed the outcome of the expert evidence application. The tribunal also considered that arguments requiring determination of the legality of MOIS had repeatedly been rejected and could not properly be reopened.

The tribunal did not decide whether Detriment 2 should be struck out. It found that there was a central disputed factual issue about whether the claimant's computer had been hacked and whether HMRC or someone acting for HMRC was responsible. It refused an unless order but required the claimant to provide the full factual basis of the allegation before the tribunal would consider prospects of success.

The tribunal struck out Detriment 3. It found that any allegation that HMRC obtained an injunction was vexatious or had no reasonable prospect of success because previous decisions had concluded there was no such injunction. It also found no reasonable prospect in an allegation of an unsuccessful injunction application. The claim against the Minister was struck out because proceedings against the Crown had not been brought against an authorised government department, the point had already been determined in earlier proceedings, and there was no reasonable prospect of establishing liability or detriment from the absence of a response within seven days.