Mr R Wooder Jaguar Land Rover Limited v Respondent — 2023

The claimant brought a victimisation claim under section 27 Equality Act 2010 arising out of his earlier sex discrimination proceedings, claim 1302563/2018, issued on 23 May 2018. The tribunal accepted that bringing that earlier claim was a protected act. It also recorded that the claimant withdrew his disability discrimination claim and his claim for other payments, which were dismissed on withdrawal.

On the facts, the tribunal found that the shared parental leave application of 9 October 2019 was rejected because it had been made on the wrong form, and that John Williams was acting as messenger rather than decision-maker. It found no refusal by John Williams to supply the correct form, and found that the claimant later obtained and submitted the correct form, which was granted. The tribunal also found that the first-day absence meeting on 10 October 2019, the requirement to ring in during absence, the subsequent absence review meetings, and the later employment review were part of the respondent's attendance management process and were not prompted by the earlier proceedings.

The tribunal accepted that some matters could amount to detriments in principle, particularly the 10 October 2019 meeting and the repeated call-in requirement, but it held that the necessary causal link with the protected act was not proved. It found that David Broady had no knowledge of the earlier litigation when he arranged the first meeting, and that John Williams' knowledge arose no earlier than 9 October 2019. The tribunal preferred the contemporaneous notes and occupational health reports, found that the claimant was not threatened with dismissal, and found that the medical evidence supported an eventual phased return to work, which occurred on 16 March 2020.

Applying section 136 Equality Act 2010 and the authorities cited on burden of proof and detriment, including Barton, Igen, Ayodele, Shamoon, Greater Manchester Police v Bailey, Nagarajan and Villalba, the tribunal concluded that the protected act had no material influence on the respondent's decisions. The victimisation claim was therefore dismissed.