Ms S Collings v Barkers of Richmond Limited and and 1 other — 2019

At a public preliminary hearing on 8 November 2019, the tribunal considered consolidated claims 2502200/2019 and 2503467/2019. The main issues were whether Ms S Collings was disabled for Equality Act purposes during the period 17 January 2019 to 5 July 2019, and whether she had enough continuous service to bring an ordinary unfair dismissal claim. The respondents conceded that she was disabled from 5 March 2019 onwards, but not for the earlier contested period, and they disputed that she had continuous employment because they said there had been a break between 9 February 2017 and 27 July 2017.

On disability, the tribunal accepted that Ms Collings had Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder or Borderline Personality Disorder, anxiety, depression and post traumatic stress disorder at all material times. It accepted her evidence, supported by her partner and contemporaneous medical records, that she had difficulty with everyday tasks, communicating, leaving the house, sleeping and concentrating, and that she experienced frequent crying, suicidal thoughts and periods of sickness absence. Applying s.6 Equality Act 2010, and the authorities it cited including Aderemi and Martin, the tribunal found that the effects were substantial and long term, and that medication and treatment reduced the symptoms. It held that she was disabled throughout the whole of the contested period and at all material times for the claim.

On continuity of employment, the tribunal accepted Ms Collings's evidence that she remained employed by Barkers of Richmond Limited as manager throughout the disputed period and continued to attend, carry out managerial work, assist with redecoration and receive weekly cash wages. It preferred her documentary evidence, including emails, a rota, a diary entry and a WhatsApp message, together with the evidence of Mrs Bohanan and parts of Mr Karl Moore's evidence. The tribunal found that the respondents had not rebutted the statutory presumption of continuity under s.210(5) ERA 1996, and concluded that she had sufficient continuity of employment under s.108(1) ERA 1996 to bring an ordinary unfair dismissal claim under s.94 ERA 1996. The judgment did not decide the substantive discrimination, dismissal, wrongful dismissal or deduction claims, and no remedy was awarded in this decision.