Ms T Rawson v Primelife Ltd — 2020

This was a record of an open preliminary hearing heard by Employment Judge P Britton sitting alone on 26 August 2020. The tribunal dealt with limitation only. It treated the claimant as disabled by reason of depression for the material period, but the claim was already out of time: the effective date of termination was 20 August 2019, the ACAS Early Conciliation period was taken into account, and the ET1 was not presented until 6 February 2020, about seven weeks late.

The tribunal dismissed the constructive unfair dismissal and non-payment of wages claims under s.111(2) ERA 1996. It found that it had been reasonably practicable for those claims to be presented in time and that the claimant had not shown a good explanation for the delay. The judge noted that she knew about tribunal claims and time limits, had already engaged with ACAS Early Conciliation between 18 October and 18 November 2019, and could have presented the claims in late November 2019 or during January 2020 while working in her new job as a senior carer.

The disability discrimination claim was dismissed under s.123(1)(a) Equality Act 2010 because it was not just and equitable to extend time. The tribunal applied the guidance in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and also referred to Palmer v Southend on Sea Borough Council, Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link, and Lupetti v Wens Old Music House Ltd. It considered the delay, the prejudice to both parties, and the weakness of the pleaded discrimination case, including that the claim largely concerned matters before the cook role, that the demotion-related point had been withdrawn, and that there was no pleaded disability complaint after she became a cook.

The judge also recorded that the claimant had withdrawn the demotion-based part of the case. On the evidence before the tribunal, the remaining disability claim was described as very doubtful on the merits, including because the claimant had not alleged that her failure to obtain renewed medication accreditation was caused by disability and because the concept of a continuing act did not assist her. All claims were therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.