Mr Amornthep Srisa-art v Humble Group Ltd — 2023

This was a preliminary hearing about time limits and amendment, not a final merits judgment. Mr Amornthep Srisa-art had worked for Humble Group Ltd from 10 March 2020 as a sous-chef. He resigned by letter dated 27 July 2022, saying he was resigning because of his health condition. The tribunal noted uncertainty about the effective date of termination because the resignation letter did not clearly state whether notice was being given, the respondent accepted the resignation without clarifying that point, the P45 gave 1 August 2022 as the leaving date, and the final payslip covered 1 to 31 August 2022.

On the unfair dismissal claim, the tribunal applied s.111(2)(b) ERA 1996 and the authorities cited in the judgment, including Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd and Wall's Meat Co Ltd v Khan. It accepted the claimant's evidence that he had significant ongoing neurological symptoms from May 2022, including problems with speech, memory, focus, concentration, and understanding, and that he was initially focused on possible personal injury issues rather than employment time limits. The tribunal found that his ignorance of the three-month time limit was reasonable in the circumstances, that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time, and that the ET1 was then filed within such further period as was reasonable. It therefore extended time and refused the respondent's strike-out application.

The tribunal also allowed the claimant to amend his claim to allege that the dismissal was an act of disability discrimination under sections 13 and/or 15 Equality Act 2010. Applying the Selkent and Abercrombie approach, it treated the amendment as a relabelling of the same core facts rather than a wholly new claim, noted that the respondent had already addressed disability discrimination in its ET3 on a protective basis, and found no significant prejudice to the respondent. If time extension was needed for the amended claim, the tribunal held that it was just and equitable to extend time under s.123(1)(b) Equality Act 2010. The judgment ended with both claims allowed to proceed to a final hearing.