In person For the v Respondent — 2023

This was a preliminary hearing on 18 August 2023 before Employment Judge S Moore. The tribunal considered whether the claimant was a disabled person at any point between 21 July 2021 and 28 October 2022, and whether his equal pay complaint should be struck out or made the subject of a deposit order. The claimant was represented by himself and the respondent by counsel.

On disability, the tribunal accepted that the claimant had experienced mental health difficulties, but found that he was not shown to satisfy section 6 Equality Act 2010 during the relevant period. It held that the 2020 absence following his father's death was a reaction to a traumatic life event rather than a mental impairment, and that the February to June 2022 absences were better explained as a stress reaction to workplace issues rather than a qualifying impairment. The tribunal found that by 15 September 2022 the claimant had developed a medical condition described as mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, but concluded that it was not long-term because it was linked to the ongoing workplace dispute and was likely to resolve if those issues were resolved or he moved jobs.

The tribunal referred to section 6 Equality Act 2010, the statutory meaning of substantial and long-term adverse effect, Schedule 1 paragraph 2, section 212(1) and the guidance, and J v DLA Piper UK LLP. It therefore found that the claimant was not disabled at any point during his employment with Network Rail and struck out the disability discrimination claim.

On equal pay, the tribunal recorded that the claimant had alleged he was paid less than various comparators, including female comparators, and that one comparator was said to have been paid about £12,000 per year more. It held that the substance of the complaint was unfairness in pay across Isolation Planner roles, not a properly pleaded equal pay claim based on sex. The tribunal concluded that even if equal work were shown, the respondent would likely be able to show that any differences in pay were not because of sex, and it struck out the equal pay claim under rule 37(1)(a) as having no reasonable prospect of success.