In person For the v Respondent — 2022

At the preliminary hearing on 7 December 2022, Employment Judge S Moore decided that Mr Andrew Pearce was not a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 Equality Act 2010 at the material time, identified as March 2021. The consequence was that the claim of disability discrimination was struck out. The claimant had relied on depression and anxiety, and on epilepsy, as the relevant impairments.

Applying the statutory definition and the four-limb approach in Goodwin v Patent Office, the tribunal focused first on whether there was a physical or mental impairment with a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. It accepted that there was evidence of stress, disturbed sleep, low mood, difficulty getting going in the morning and some reduced stamina, but found the evidence of functional impact too vague to establish a substantial adverse effect. The tribunal also noted that the claimant continued to act as a town councillor, volunteered at a school, wrote lengthy emails and sought legal advice, and it treated those matters as inconsistent with a substantial limitation.

On the mental health evidence, the tribunal found the material pointed more to a stress reaction to events at work than to a mental impairment of depression and anxiety. It noted that the GP records and fit notes repeatedly referred to work-related stress, that the claimant's own communications often focused on obtaining certificates, avoiding disciplinary proceedings or seeking legal advice, and that his life outside work did not appear to have been substantially affected. The tribunal also considered the medication point under Schedule 1 paragraph 5, but was not satisfied that, in the absence of medical evidence about the effect without medication, the claimant would have had a substantial adverse effect.

As to epilepsy, the tribunal accepted that the claimant had epilepsy but found no evidence that it had a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. It recorded the history of a seizure in December 2019 and the claimant's evidence that epilepsy had no other direct impact, and concluded that epilepsy did not make him a disabled person for the purposes of the Act at the relevant time.