Miss T Walton v Vetpartners Practices Limited — 2023

The hearing was listed to decide a preliminary issue: whether Miss T Walton was disabled at the material time for the purposes of section 6 Equality Act 2010. The respondent accepted that she was disabled by reason of depression and anxiety, but disputed that her knee injury met the statutory definition. The tribunal therefore focused on whether the knee injury involved a physical impairment with a substantial and long-term adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities.

The tribunal accepted the claimant's evidence about the effects of the knee injury, including difficulty preparing food, sleeping, moving around the house, bathing, dressing, exercising, using stairs, and walking. It reviewed the January, March, April and May 2022 orthopaedic clinic letters, the occupational health reports from March and April 2022, and the claimant's account of ongoing pain, use of braces and crutches, reduced mobility, muscle loss, and the interaction between her anxiety and rehabilitation. The tribunal found the occupational health reports and clinic letters should be treated with caution, because they were based on telephone assessments or brief clinical snapshots and did not fully reflect the claimant's day-to-day condition.

Applying section 6 EqA 2010 and the authorities it cited, including Goodwin v Patent Office, SCA Packaging Ltd v Boyle and Cruickshank v VAW Motorcast Ltd, the tribunal found that the impairment had a substantial adverse effect and that the only live question was long-term effect. Taking a holistic view of the evidence as at the relevant time, and noting that six months had passed since the injury, that symptoms and restrictions were still significant in May 2022, that physiotherapy had stopped, and that the injury remained linked with anxiety and reduced rehabilitation, the tribunal found the knee injury was likely to last 12 months.

The tribunal therefore held that Miss Walton was a disabled person for the purposes of section 6 Equality Act 2010 by virtue of her knee injury. No monetary award was made in this judgment, because it resolved only the preliminary disability-status issue.