Members: Mrs EA Farrell Mr AB Grant Mrs Joan Newlands v Loans Company Limited — 2017

The claimant was employed by the respondent from 7 February 2000 until 5 March 2015. After returning from maternity leave in February 2014, she raised concerns about the way she was managed by Mr Phillips, particularly following the 30 April 2014 telephone call to her husband about her absence and the way her complaints were handled under the respondent's Respect at Work process. The tribunal accepted that the relationship between the claimant and Mr Phillips had broken down and that some allegations in the complaint process were found to be founded, including the telephone call, applying different rules about flexi time, and intimidating conduct involving interruptions and wheeling a chair between people.

For the constructive dismissal claim, the tribunal applied the implied term of trust and confidence and the last-straw approach. It accepted that the withdrawal of Mr Phillips' Respect at Work complaint, followed by the February 2015 email about a record of discussion, was capable of being a final straw in context. However, it held that the withdrawal itself was not an act of the respondent, that the respondent had reasonable and proper cause to handle matters in the way it did, and that the overall conduct of the respondent was not a fundamental breach of contract. The claim of constructive unfair dismissal was therefore dismissed.

On the sex discrimination claim, the claimant alleged that from February 2014 she was not given the opportunity to take part in live deployments, which carried additional remuneration, whereas male colleagues were. The tribunal held that she had not established a prima facie case. It found that there was no formal overtime rota, live deployments were voluntary, the claimant had not volunteered or asked to be included after her return, and the male colleagues who did participate were more senior or otherwise differently placed. The tribunal accepted that the reasons suggested by the claimant for her exclusion did not amount to less favourable treatment because of sex, so the sex discrimination claim was dismissed.