Dr A Dawson v University of Stirling — 2026

At the preliminary hearing on 17 July 2026, Employment Judge McFatridge allowed amendments and further particulars of Dr A Dawson's disability discrimination claims against the University of Stirling. The University accepted that she was disabled but denied discrimination. The application dated 15 June 2026 to amend the section 15 Equality Act claim was accepted without objection. The merits of the unfair dismissal and disability discrimination claims were not determined.

The tribunal held that the answers at paragraphs 3.3–3.7 further particularised an existing reasonable adjustments claim. The ET1 had already alleged that disability placed Dr Dawson at a disadvantage in meeting requirements to obtain external research funding. The additional details concerned an Occupational Health referral, further counselling and clarification of what she needed to achieve to retain employment. The tribunal considered that, on her pleaded case, the claim appeared to be in time, although the precise point when the alleged failure occurred remained unclear. Alternatively, it considered it just and equitable to hear the claim, weighing the limited additional expense to the University against denying Dr Dawson the opportunity to pursue it.

The tribunal treated paragraphs 33 and 34 as an amendment introducing direct disability discrimination allegations about the failure to negotiate voluntary arrangements and the terms of Dr Dawson's redundancy. The University's 2025 Voluntary Severance Scheme was introduced on 30 June 2025, after her dismissal and the lodging of the ET1. Dr Dawson explained that the paragraphs should be read together: she alleged that disability was the reason voluntary negotiations were not offered, and that preparations for the later scheme would have been relevant had negotiations taken place. The tribunal did not decide whether those allegations were established.

Applying the Selkent principles, the tribunal found that this was a substantial amendment. Its inclusion in further particulars lodged in October 2025, more than three months after the scheme's introduction, weighed heavily against allowing it. However, the tribunal expected limited prejudice to the University, principally further questions for existing witnesses and possible steps to identify a comparator. It also considered that refusing the amendment would leave no apparent direct discrimination claim before the tribunal. Taking account of Dr Dawson's lack of representation and the limited terms of her allegations, it allowed the amendment.

The breach of contract claim was struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success. Dr Dawson confirmed that she had received her contractual notice pay in full and was not claiming wrongful dismissal. The tribunal explained that damages for wrongful termination were limited to the notice pay entitlement. It understood the remaining allegation as a personal injury claim arising from breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence, which fell outside its contractual jurisdiction under the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (Scotland) Order 1994. No monetary award was recorded.