In person For the v Respondent — 2017

Ms Parsons, acting through Janette Parsons Ltd, brought harassment, direct discrimination, victimisation and whistleblowing complaints arising from her consultancy work with Birmingham City Council and the proposed Birmingham Children’s Trust. The Tribunal found she was a disabled person for Equality Act purposes by 7 August 2017, and that she was a worker for whistleblowing purposes under the extended definition in the Employment Rights Act 1996. It also found that the parties had different expectations about her role, the scope of her work packages, and how she should fit into the evolving Trust structure.

On the Equality Act claims, the Tribunal dismissed the harassment allegations under section 26, applying Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal and Land Registry v Grant, because most of the complained-of conduct was not related to age, disability or sex. It accepted that one 7 September 2017 email from Mr Harrison created a humiliating environment, but found that the comment was not motivated by any protected characteristic. The direct discrimination claims under section 13 also failed: applying the burden-of-proof and comparator approach in Shamoon, Madarassy and Nagarajan, the Tribunal found no primary facts from which discrimination could properly be inferred, and no satisfactory basis for saying that a hypothetical comparator would have been treated differently.

The disability claim failed in addition because the Tribunal found that several of the alleged decision-makers did not know, and could not properly be fixed with constructive knowledge of, the Claimant’s disability at the material times, applying Gallop. The victimisation claim failed because the first protected act was the 13 September 2017 meeting with Ms Hewins, so earlier events could not be retaliatory, and later management decisions were found to be responses to the developing dispute rather than detriments imposed because she had done protected acts. The Tribunal also noted that some disputed matters, including standing down from engagement sessions and the handling of meeting invitations, were ordinary management responses to the situation as it developed.

The Tribunal upheld one whistleblowing complaint under section 48(1A) ERA 1996. It found that the Claimant’s 14 October 2017 disclosure about the measures letter and TUPE consultation was a qualifying disclosure made in the public interest within section 43B, and that the First Respondent’s failure to investigate and reach a conclusion on that disclosure was a detriment because she had made it. It dismissed the remaining whistleblowing detriment allegations because, at the material times, the relevant individuals were unaware of the protected disclosure or the evidence did not establish a causal link. No remedy was assessed in this judgment and the case was listed for a remedy hearing.