Davina Srodzinski v Burncoose Nurseries LLP — 2026

The tribunal found that Davina Srodzinski was disabled at the relevant time within section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 by reason of phobic anxiety disorder, or cynophobia. The condition had affected her for approximately 50 years and had a more than minor or trivial effect on day-to-day activities, including travelling, using public transport and leaving her home. The tribunal did not consider her prolactinoma or bladder condition relevant to the pleaded provision, criterion or practice and disadvantage.

The tribunal found that Burncoose Nurseries LLP had constructive knowledge of the claimant's disability and disadvantage from 27 March 2019, when she disclosed her phobia of dogs, felt unable to leave her vehicle because of a dog and reported that she was not OK because dogs were present off the lead. It also found that the respondent had a practice of allowing dogs to be unleashed on its premises and that this placed the claimant at a substantial disadvantage through extreme anxiety and associated effects.

For the reasonable adjustments complaint, the tribunal considered that enforcing the requirement for dogs to be kept on leads was a reasonable step and that this aspect of the allegation was well-founded on its merits. It found, however, that offering the claimant the office role was not a reasonable adjustment because it was an entirely different role requiring computer skills that the claimant did not have. Applying the limitation principles for an omission to make adjustments, the tribunal found that time began to run on 27 March 2019 when Mr Mills acted inconsistently with an intention to comply with the duty. The same practice continued thereafter, so events in 2023 and 2024 did not create a new cause of action. The claim presented on 13 August 2024 was more than five years out of time.

Harassment Act 1 concerned the refusal to give the claimant an office role in October 2023. It was added as a harassment allegation on 16 June 2026 and was approximately two and a half years out of time. The tribunal also found that it was not well-founded on its merits because the reason the claimant was not appointed was her inability to work with computers and the refusal was not otherwise related to disability. Harassment Act 2 concerned an alleged statement by Mr Mills on 11 or 12 March 2024 that the claimant would be put in a cage. That complaint was in time, but the tribunal preferred Mr Mills' evidence that he had not made the statement and dismissed the allegation as not well-founded.

In considering whether to extend time, the tribunal took account of the merits of the dogs-on-leads adjustment, the effect of dismissal on a current employee, the length and reasons for the delays, and the availability of witnesses. It found that the length of the delays outweighed the factors favouring an extension and that it was not just and equitable to extend time for either the reasonable adjustments complaint or harassment Act 1. All complaints were dismissed, and no monetary remedy was awarded or determined.