Ms Danielle French v Health-on-Line Company UK Limited (AXA PPP) — 2021

Ms French worked for Health-On-Line Company UK Limited from July 2014 as a Senior Sales Consultant. She resigned on 31 May 2019 with an effective date of termination of 28 June 2019. Her ET1 was received electronically two minutes after midnight, after early conciliation with ACAS ran from 24 September 2019 to 18 October 2019 and extended the primary limitation date to 18 November 2019. The tribunal first addressed the unfair dismissal complaint, which the claimant accepted had been presented late because of IT problems and a panic attack.

Applying s.111(2) ERA 1996 and the authorities it cited, including Consignia plc v Sealy, Electronic Security Systems Ltd v Avdic, Beasley v National Grid Electricity Transmissions and Miller v Community Links Trust Ltd, the tribunal accepted the claimant's explanation and held that it was not reasonably practicable to present the unfair dismissal claim on time. It concluded that the claim had then been presented within a reasonable further period, so the unfair dismissal complaint was in time.

On the disability discrimination complaints, the tribunal treated the constructive dismissal itself as the act complained of for the s.15 Equality Act 2010 time-limit issue, relying on Nottinghamshire County Council v Gaynor Meikle and s.39(7) Equality Act 2010. It held that the discrimination arising from dismissal complaint was also one day late, or two minutes late, but that it was just and equitable to extend time under s.123(1) Equality Act 2010. In reaching that conclusion it referred to the short length of the delay, the lack of forensic prejudice, the overlap with the in-time unfair dismissal claim, and authorities including Robertson v Bexley Community Centre, Miller v Ministry of Justice and British Coal Corporation v Keeble.

The tribunal applied the same just-and-equitable reasoning to the complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments under s.21 and harassment under s.26. It said there was at least an arguable continuing act or ongoing failure and that it would be wrong in principle to divide the discrimination complaints on time-limit grounds where they arose from the same factual background. The judgment was limited to the preliminary issue of time; it did not decide the substantive merits of any claim and made no award.