Case 1600517/2019 · Employment Tribunal
Miss L Merriman v The London Mint Office — 2020
- Case reference
- 1600517/2019
- Decision date
- 17 February 2020
- Jurisdiction
- England & Wales
- Judge
- Employment Judge Harfield Members
- Venue
- Cardiff
- Panel members
- Mrs L Bishop, Mr P Charles
Parties
2 namedClaimant
Miss L Merriman
Respondent
Key findings
Tribunal's reasoningMiss L Merriman brought claims against The London Mint Office for direct sex discrimination, harassment related to sex and victimisation. The Tribunal found that after she moved from the collections team to the TFUP sales team in November 2018, she entered a relationship with Manager A, that the relationship later broke down, and that gossip and disruption developed on the sales floor. On 4 January 2019 Ms Lawrence told her she was moving back to collections, that the real reason had to remain confidential, and that she should say collections needed help. The Tribunal found there had been some misunderstanding about the exact sequence Ms Lawrence expected, but that the claimant understood she was not to reveal the real reason for the move.
The direct sex discrimination complaints failed. The Tribunal found the move back to collections was made because Ms Lawrence and RK wanted to separate the claimant and Manager A and reduce disruption to the business, not because the claimant was a woman. It found the claimant was moved rather than Manager A because she had only recently joined TFUP, had short service and earlier experience in collections, whereas Manager A was more senior and more established in the sales team. The reduction in earnings potential was treated as a consequence of that move rather than a separate discriminatory decision. The dismissal on 8 January 2019 was found to have been based on Ms Lawrence's belief that the claimant had breached an instruction not to discuss the reason for the move and had continued to discuss the situation at work, not on sex.
The harassment complaint also failed. The Tribunal rejected the Facebook contact of 17 November 2018 as unwanted conduct or conduct with the required effect under section 26. It found that the 8 January 2019 email attaching the audio recording was sent by the claimant herself, so it could not be harassment by the respondent. It also found that the 26 March 2019 incident at the claimant's new workplace was, at most, a private dispute about a vehicle invoice and was not shown to have been carried out in the course of employment by anyone for whom the respondent was responsible.
The victimisation claim failed because the pleaded protected acts were not made out. The Tribunal held that the 4 January conversation and the 7 January request for reasons did not amount to protected acts, because they did not complain of discrimination. Although a later email referred to discrimination, it was not part of the pleaded protected acts and, in any event, did not materially influence the dismissal decision. The Tribunal therefore dismissed the claim in full and made no award.
Claims and outcomes
3 findings recorded| Claim type | Issue or finding | Outcome | Protected characteristic | Award |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sex discrimination | The direct sex discrimination complaint covered three alleged acts: the request on 4 January 2019 that the claimant move back to the collections team, the resulting change in pay and earnings potential, and the dismissal on 8 January 2019. The Tribunal found the move was decided by Ms Lawrence in discussion with RK because of business disruption arising from the claimant's relationship and its breakdown, including gossip on the sales floor, the need to separate the claimant and Manager A, and the claimant's junior and short-service position in the TFUP team. Manager A was not treated as a true comparator because he was more senior, had longer service and was more established in the sales team. The Tribunal also found the pay consequences flowed from the move rather than from a separate discriminatory decision, and that the dismissal was because Ms Lawrence believed the claimant had breached an instruction not to discuss the reason for the move and was continuing to fuel disruption, not because she was female. | Dismissed | Sex | — |
| Harassment | The harassment complaint covered the Facebook contact on 17 November 2018, the email of 8 January 2019 attaching the audio recording, and the incident at the claimant's new workplace on 26 March 2019. The Tribunal found the Facebook exchange was friendly, work-related and not unwanted, and it did not have the purpose or effect required by section 26. It found, on the balance of probabilities, that the 8 January email was sent by the claimant herself, so it could not amount to harassment by the respondent or its employees. As to the March 2019 incident, the Tribunal found any reference to the dismissal circumstances was made in a private dispute and was not shown to have been done in the course of employment by anyone for whom the respondent was legally responsible. | Dismissed | Sex | — |
| Victimisation | The Tribunal held that the pleaded protected acts were not established. It was not satisfied that the 4 January 2019 conversation with Ms Lawrence was a complaint of discrimination, and the 7 January email asking for reasons for the move did not refer to discrimination. Although a later email on the team leader issue did mention discrimination, that was not part of the pleaded protected acts and in any event was not a material influence on the dismissal decision. The Tribunal found Ms Lawrence had already decided to dismiss the claimant for the reasons she believed had arisen from the claimant's conduct after the 4 January meeting. |
Legal tests applied
12 references- s.13 Equality Act 2010
- s.26 Equality Act 2010
- s.27 Equality Act 2010
- s.136 Equality Act 2010
- Amnesty International v Ahmed
- Bahl v Law Society
- B v A comparator analysis
- Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal
- Grant v HM Land Registry
- Igen v Wong / Madarassy
- Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
- Forbes v LHR Airport Ltd
Official outcome judgment PDF
Gov.uk primary recordThe official judgment PDF on gov.uk contains the tribunal's outcome, reasoning, and any remedy details. Where this page does not yet show extracted outcomes for every claim, use the PDF as the authoritative source.
Published on gov.uk under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
How we got this data
Case essentials (reference, date, judge, venue, country, claim categories) are extracted from the structured metadata gov.uk publishes alongside each decision. Parties and monetary figures are extracted from the judgment PDF text. Key findings and per-claim outcomes require a second extraction pass that is not yet complete for this case — until then, the primary source linked above is the authoritative record. See full methodology.
Named in this case and want it removed? Submit a takedown request. The page will be withdrawn on receipt and the editor will follow up within five working days.