Ms A de Vere v Tennent Caledonian Breweries (UK) Limited — 2026

This preliminary hearing determined time-limit and jurisdiction issues, not the substantive merits of the complaints. Ms de Vere confirmed that her complaints comprised constructive unfair dismissal; direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex; direct disability discrimination and discrimination arising from disability; victimisation; and detriment resulting from alleged protected disclosures.

The claimant's employment ended on 8 September 2023, making 7 December 2023 the primary deadline for her constructive unfair dismissal complaint. She presented the claim on 5 October 2025, nearly two years after that deadline, and the early conciliation commenced in 2025 did not extend a time limit which had already expired. The Tribunal found that neither the health matters relied upon nor the claimant's relationship with Pat MaAfee made it not reasonably practicable for her to present the claim by 7 December 2023. It therefore dismissed the constructive unfair dismissal complaint for lack of jurisdiction and stated that, had it been necessary to decide the point, the claim was also not presented within a reasonable further period.

For the Equality Act complaints, the Tribunal found that the alleged acts of sex discrimination and harassment during employment were arguably linked to each other, and that the alleged disability-related acts were likewise arguably linked. It did not find a reasonably arguable basis for linking those earlier complaints to the alleged victimisation on 14 August 2025: the victimisation allegation concerned a different type of detriment, involved a different person and department, and arose after the claimant's employment had ended.

The direct sex discrimination, sex-related harassment, direct disability discrimination and discrimination arising from disability complaints were presented more than two years after the employment ended. In deciding not to grant a just and equitable extension, the Tribunal considered the length of and reasons for the delay, the claimant's ability to work and to pursue separate Tribunal proceedings, the periods during which her relationship with PM had ended, and the balance of prejudice. It found no satisfactory explanation for the delay and concluded that the delay had adversely affected the likely cogency of evidence and hampered the respondent's ability to investigate. Those complaints were consequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without determination of their substantive merits.

The alleged victimisation occurred on 14 August 2025; early conciliation began six days later, and the claim was presented four days after early conciliation ended. The parties also agreed that the complaints of detriment arising from alleged protected disclosures were timeously lodged. The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over the victimisation and protected-disclosure detriment complaints, which alone would proceed. It made no substantive finding on those complaints and awarded no remedy at this stage.