Ms I Taneva v University of Edinburgh — 2026

At a preliminary hearing on 5 August 2026, Employment Judge A Kemp refused the University of Edinburgh's application to strike out Ms I Taneva's claim, either wholly or partly. Her claims of direct race discrimination, harassment related to race, victimisation and whistleblowing detriment remained for determination. The tribunal dismissed the direct sex discrimination and sex-related harassment claims under Rule 51 after she confirmed that she did not wish to pursue them and withdrew them.

Ms Taneva remained employed by the University. This was her second claim, presented on 2 June 2026 following an earlier claim presented on 28 August 2025. She sought to rely on protected acts and alleged disclosures identified in the first proceedings, two additional alleged disclosures predating those proceedings, and the commencement of early conciliation and the first claim itself. Her race discrimination and harassment allegations concerned exclusion from a meeting on 24 February 2026 and a refusal by Ms McRorie to engage with her. These were allegations, not findings that discrimination or harassment had occurred.

The tribunal rejected the respondent's reliance on Henderson v Henderson, holding that its rule was not part of Scots law. Res judicata did not apply because the first claim had not yet been determined. The second claim was not vexatious: repeated references to earlier acts and disclosures could support allegations of later detriments or provide background. All but one of the nine alleged detriments at least arguably occurred or continued after the first claim was presented. The laptop replacement issue appeared to have ended earlier, but could still provide background or support an argument about acts extending over a period. Bringing a second claim was a permissible option, although the claimant could have sought to amend the first.

The tribunal also refused strike-out on time-limit grounds under section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. Whether the alleged events formed conduct extending over a period depended on disputed facts requiring evidence. Any just and equitable extension for the Equality Act claims, including the respondent's argument about forensic prejudice, also required factual assessment. The reasonable practicability test for the whistleblowing claim was more demanding, but remained fact-sensitive. The tribunal did not finally resolve those jurisdictional questions.

On prospects of success, the tribunal found a core of disputed facts and applied the authorities requiring particular care before striking out discrimination claims or claims brought by a party litigant. The claimant's lengthy pleadings lacked clarity, but she supplied further detail at the hearing and intended to seek an amendment. The tribunal said her alleged detriments were at the low end of what might qualify and her prospects were somewhat less than good on the available material. That did not establish no reasonable prospect of success. It also relied on the respondent bearing the onus for the Employment Rights Act claim. Strike-out would not be proportionate, and less severe procedural steps were available.